Confusion
in the corporate sector
So, does a planned baton change that includes cultural
continuity, GE style, satisfy the market and bring a better chance of success?
Woolworths sets up contest for chief
executive job (headline from Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May
2003)
WOOLWORTHS
Woolworths has worked at its succession
planning. For example, when the then Chief Executive Harry Watts died suddenly
in 1993 during a game of golf with Greg Norman, the board had three internal
candidates ready to choose from-Reg Clairs, Roger Corbett and John Brunton.
Clairs was appointed. When Clairs announced his
intention to retire, Corbett was appointed in 1999 after already having been on
the Woolworths board for nine years. Corbett was Managing Director of Big W from
1990 to 1993, Deputy Group Managing Director of Woolworths from 1993 to 1997,
and Managing Director (retail) from 1997 to 1999.
Despite his history with Woolworths, the share
market reacted negatively to Corbett's appointment, saying that it would trigger
a change in direction for Woolies even though Corbett said the fears were
unfounded. The share price dropped to $5.
The reaction of the market to Corbett's
appointment was interesting. Logically you might expect that the market would
‘approve' an internal appointment because the appointee would have a head start
in understanding the challenges and culture. They would also know what had to
change to take the organisation to the next level.
In this instance, the market seemed to fear a
change in direction. Did the market believe that Woolies was already on the
right track? Had the market decided that Clairs's approach and the culture that
existed under his leadership did not need to alter?
If so, the market's reaction was curious
because, in my experience, a preference ‘to not rock the boat' is rarely high on
the list of desirable attributes for a new CEO or other senior management
position. On the contrary, one of the most important criteria is often the
ability to initiate and respond to changes.
As it turns out, by financial measures at least,
the market's fears for Woolworths under Corbett appear to be unwarranted. From
June 1999 to September 2002, Woolworths's sales increased 28.9%, to $24.5
billion, with earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) up 34% to $832.7 million
and net profit up 77.1% to $523.2 million. The share price in mid-2003 was
around $12.
And what of Woolies's plans for Corbett's
successor? In 1999, Bill Wavish was appointed CFO and appeared to be the next in
line. Four years on, in April 2003, Wavish sought clarity about when he would be
taking over from Corbett. The board told him that he would not!
While we can only go on media reports about
the reason his ascension was blocked, ironically it may have been that his plans
for expansion and his vision for the future did not sit comfortably with the
‘historically conservative company'.[18] The more things change . .
. ?
Not surprisingly Wavish resigned.
Woolworths continued its proactive succession planning and, in May 2003, it
announced another round of promotions-‘all part of management
development'-keeping pressure on and maintaining competition between the senior
executives.[19]
Interestingly, one of Jack Welch's basic objectives for GE's
succession planning was to minimise dysfunctional competition[20] having experienced it himself when he
was a contender for the CEO position.
And did I mention that James Strong is currently the Chairman of
the Board of Directors of Woolworths? Interestingly, Strong is developing a
sound record in succession planning. He left Qantas with two powerful internal
candidates as his successor-Geoff Dixon and Gary Toomey. Dixon subsequently
became CEO of Qantas and Toomey left and became CEO of the now-failed
Ansett.
What does this tell us? Even the best succession planning does not
guarantee a smooth transition. The market is fickle. Some institutions prefer
‘home-grown' candidates, while others ‘reward' companies that make external
appointments by increasing the stock price on announcement of the new CEO.
Whatever the market says at the time, recognise it for what it
is-a short-term and immediate reaction that will just as quickly change as
positive results begin to emerge. The key message is to plan for succession
rather than make the appointment ‘on the run'; potentially a far more expensive
and disastrous scenario as the CEO churn might show.
Taking the
long-term view
Do you think it is appropriate that market reaction should
have any influence on an organisation's approach to succession planning?
Further, given that the average CEO tenure is only 2.75 years, is it worth the
board's or the CEO's time to even attempt to turn around a culture that is not
change-ready or adaptable?
Maybe if organisations paid more attention to succession planning
and culture, then average tenure and performance would improve.
It is almost hackneyed now to say that workplace cultures take a
long time to change and adjust. Welch took over 15 years to change the GE
culture to one with an ongoing ability to learn and adapt. Because he had spent
so much time embedding and continuously reinforcing this culture, Welch was not
worried about the impact of his successor on the GE culture-each of the
contenders brought the same cultural approach with them. In any event, the
culture itself ensured that the company could withstand the changes.
Other examples also demonstrate that it takes at least 5 years
(often longer) and much pain and determination to embed cultural changes in an
organisation.
Think of the torrid battle to change the culture of the Australian
waterfront in the late 1990s. Patrick Stevedoring incurred significant losses
during the reform process. Chief Executive Chris Corrigan was under immense
personal and professional pressure to deliver change. Under the current
‘short-term' view of corporate success, with impatient shareholders and markets,
would Corrigan have had the support to take the short-term financial losses and
push through for longer-term reforms if not for government backing?[21] Would you have
had the appetite to sustain those losses if you were a board member then?
In the Hunter Valley in 1997, when the Chief Executive of Coal and
Allied, Kim Tronson, pushed though changes to the deeply embedded workplace
culture of the coal-mining industry, the share price initially dropped
dramatically to $6. It eventually rose to $31 in 2002. In June 2003, it was
around $22. It was fortunate for Coal and Allied that its major shareholder, Rio
Tinto, was prepared to stay the course. Without Rio's deep pockets and its clear
strategic commitment to the long-term result, what would have been the
enthusiasm for Tronson to keep challenging the powerful union culture?
Intolerance for slow and painful change continues. As I write, the
market is looking critically at John Fletcher (appointed in 2001) in his role at
Coles Myer and Ziggy Switkowski (CEO since 1999) at Telstra. These CEOs, in the
longer-term interests of the shareholders, are attempting to transform large
organisations with deeply embedded cultures. Yet realistically, how much time
will they be given to deliver results?
What makes the influence of the market and the emphasis on the
short-term even more curious is that, in 2001 and in 2002, the BRW most-admired
business leader was Michael Chaney, Chief Executive of Wesfarmers, and the
most-admired company was also Wesfarmers.[22] Known as ‘Mr Consistency', Chaney holds the
view that consistent strategy and performance and a long-term focus on
shareholder value are the hallmarks of chief executive success. He says the
greatest challenge is to be consistent and to keep other people from deflecting
you into the next new acquisition or project.
Another of the 2002 most-admired business leaders, Wal King of
Leighton Holdings, agrees, saying that chief executives need to distinguish
between ‘fragrance cycles' and substance.[23]
So, the corporate sector provides a confusing and
contradictory tale about the importance of culture in CEO succession planning
for boards and stock markets. Unfortunately, these challenges are not confined
to private enterprise.